Despite a decade of celebrated democratic reforms, the threat of the military’s return to absolute power was long brewing beneath the surface
Myanmar Now
A soldier stands guard on a road as security forces search for protesters who took part in a demonstration against the military coup in Yangon in May 2021 (Photo: STR / AFP)
On January 29, 2017, a prominent Myanmar lawyer and icon of constitutional reform Ko Ni was shot in the head as he hailed a taxi at Yangon airport.
His assassination—by military affiliates—sent shockwaves through the country.
The brazen act was yet another indication that despite governance by an elected civilian administration, the Myanmar military was willing to use brute force to eliminate those who threatened its own carefully orchestrated place in politics.
Four years later almost to the day, the military staged a coup, shutting down what many now remember as Myanmar’s short experiment with democracy.
Ko Ni had been a long-time legal advisor to Aung San Suu Kyi, de-facto head of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government at that time. The lawyer was one of Myanmar’s most outspoken advocates for legal reform, highlighting the deep flaws of the undemocratic military-drafted 2008 Constitution and the extreme built-in difficulties of amending it.
A photo by an anonymous user posted on Facebook shows U Ko Ni holding a child at Yangon International Airport moments before he was assassinated
The charter barred Suu Kyi from the Presidency through her earlier marriage to a UK national and her adult children’s UK citizenship. However, Ko Ni uncovered a loophole in the constitution that allowed for the creation of the new position of “State Counsellor.” The role made it possible for her to lead her administration, ranked second after the President and above the military chief at number eight.
Yet his public push for constitutional change essentially put a military target on his back.
Those mourning his death noted that in the days after his killing, Suu Kyi did not speak out, nor was she amongst the thousands at his funeral. The NLD likely believed that signs of solidarity with Ko Ni were dangerous, and that her government’s delicate balance of power with the military could fall through at any time. Despite concessions and accommodations made to the armed forces, it still collapsed.
While the world applauded Myanmar’s perceived “democratic transition,” the military had ensured its longevity as a political player within the text of the constitution that Ko Ni, along with a range of civil society organisations and rights activists, had challenged. It is in this charter that the seeds of a later coup were arguably planted.
Drafted under a military regime headed by Senior-General Than Shwe, this charter was carefully devised to ensure that the armed forces remained Myanmar’s dominant political power, even after future elections
Tap on the constitution to see details.
In this first article in a series of three, we trace the course from decades of outright military dictatorship to the hybrid administrations that followed, until tanks rolled into Naypyitaw to attempt another direct seizure of power on February 1, 2021.
A soldier stands next to a detained man during a demonstration against the military coup in Mandalay in March 2021 (Photo: STR / AFP)
Since its 1948 independence from Britain, Myanmar’s politics has been defined by dictatorship, save for a brief dalliance with democracy in the 1950s that ended with a 1962 military coup led by Gen Ne Win.
In the decades that followed, Myanmar’s people suffered under a brutal regime of extreme repression targeting political opponents and ethnic populations. Major military offensives terrorised and displaced civilians across the country’s ethnic states, often coinciding with land grabs and a seizure of these areas’ lucrative natural resources. Widespread atrocities were committed by the military during these campaigns, ranging from extrajudicial killings to torture to sexual violence to arson and more. Dozens of ethnic armed and political organisations formed in opposition to the imposition of Bamar supremacy and military rule.
Protesters march in Mandalay in August 2021 to mark the 33rd anniversary of the 1988 uprising (Supplied)
Nationwide student-led protests erupted in 1988, with the public calling for an end to military subjugation and dire economic conditions. The military responded by killing and jailing thousands of civilians, particularly in urban areas. Many protesters and young activists fled to the jungles to form new resistance groups or join existing ethnic armed forces.
The military held what were considered surprisingly free and fair elections in 1990, in which the NLD—then a new party—competed and won by a landslide. However, the army refused to relinquish power, instead forcing the pro-democracy movement underground.
During the 1990s, the military signed bilateral ceasefire agreements with some 40 ethnic armed organisations and pro-government militias. While some of the groups in question were major forces in Kachin and Shan states, many of the groups had not engaged in active conflict with the Myanmar army.
Those who opted to sign a truce were rewarded with business deals often involving natural resource extraction or trade in narcotics; the arrangements meant that the military could pursue a strategy of divide-and-rule, instead diverting its campaigns to target groups which continued to resist. In this way, the military maintained its hold on power, and continued its efforts to crush those that threatened it.

The administration of Than Shwe, the senior general who chaired Myanmar’s military regime from 1992 until 2011, was responsible for creating the 2008 Constitution that allowed a transition from direct dictatorship to a different type of military administration designed to attract international interest after decades of isolation.
Following military-controlled elections in 2010—boycotted by the NLD and widely criticised by observers as being neither free nor fair—the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) launched an administration headed by ex-general Thein Sein.
In accordance with Than Shwe’s vision, the same group of men would continue to pull the strings in this “quasi-civilian” government.
Widely criticised as fraudulent, the 2010 election resulted in the military-backed USDP winning approximately 80 percent of the available seats in parliament. Several opposition parties submitted formal complaints to the electoral commission, raising concerns about widespread corruption. The ruling junta announced that the election—the first to be held in 20 years—marked the transition from military rule to democracy.
Tap on the map to view the results for each district.
Than Shwe ensured the stability of military rule following his political exit in 2011, and was careful in choosing his successor. He wanted someone who would not destabilise the delicate power balance, and bypassed several senior officers to appoint Min Aung Hlaing as the armed forces’ new commander-in-chief—the man who would later stage the 2021 coup.
Min Aung Hlaing was then joint chief of staff of the army, navy, and air force, and rose to prominence by overseeing a military offensive in the Kokang region bordering China against the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army that forced thousands of people from their homes.
He had no track record of political leadership. Age was likely a key criterion, according to a retired senior military officer interviewed by Myanmar Now at the time; then 55-year old Min Aung Hlaing would be able to hold his position for the five-year government term until his retirement at age 60, which he would later extend to 65, and then, for life.
Guaranteed by the 2008 Constitution to retain control of government by winning just 26 percent of elected seats up for grabs—combined with the 25 percent of seats reserved for army appointees—the military was sure it would retain power in the next election in 2015.
Aung San Suu Kyi and the Myanmar military’s commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing arrive at the presidential palace in Naypyitaw for the handover ceremony on March 30, 2016 (Photo: YE AUNG THU/AFP via Getty Images)
The Thein Sein government therefore took a step that was likely not included in Than Shwe’s transition plan: six months after the USDP took office, the President asked the NLD to cooperate with his administration and re-register as a party.
The expectation was that Suu Kyi would wield limited power, standing only as opposition in parliament.
“I would like to work effectively towards amending the Constitution. So we have to do what we need to do,” she said at the time, opting to participate in the 2012 by-elections. The NLD won 43 out of 45 seats.
With the NLD back in politics, the Thein Sein government received significant economic support from Japan and political encouragement for further reform from the US, and sanctions began to ease. International companies rushed to capitalise on Myanmar’s markets and harvest its natural resources, even as prominent ethnic civil society organisations called for a moratorium on investment until the country had undergone a genuine federal democratic transition.
The reforms of this period, while improving infrastructure and access to communications and technology particularly in urban areas, did not halt the military’s war in the ethnic states, nor did it change the structures that kept the institution firmly in control of politics and the economy.

After scoring a sweeping electoral victory in 2015, the NLD held the majority of seats in a new parliament and formed the first civilian-led government in more than 50 years. But the transition was tenuous and Aung San Suu Kyi knew it, advising her party members not to “rock the boat.”
The 2015 election resulted in the NLD winning 390 out of 476 seats across the upper and lower houses combined, well above the 322 seats needed for a parliamentary majority. At 79 percent of the vote, this was a landslide victory for the party. The USDP won 41 seats across both houses, at eight percent, a sharp decline from the 342 seats it held before the election. The NLD also won out over ethnic minority parties in most areas, with smaller ethnic-based parties gaining a significant number of votes only in Shan and Rakhine states.
Tap on the map to view the results for each district.